conceptions' in theories of linguistic understanding, concepts, and rationality. Burge calls for clarification of the notion of 'implicitness,' leading to a detailed analysis of what reflective explication of a concept grasped can involve. He argues that what guides the application of even a sharply grasped concept 'might not be purely an implicit conception or rule, but a combination of rules of thumb, paradigm cases, and a sense of mathematical similarities. That is, incomplete conceptualization of a definite concept that is being thought with may be present at both explicit and implicit levels.' This exchange contains insights on a priority the psychology and epistemology of logical thought as well as historical reflections on Leibniz and Frege.
Those who disagree with Burge on central issues will be particularly interested in the contributions of Fred Dretske, B.F. Loar, and Noam Chomsky. Chomsky's 'Internalist Explorations' criticizes 'externalism' and sees progress in the study of mind occurring only through study of the internal states of individuals. He questions the fruitfulness of thought experiments like those employed by Burge and Putnam. Burge's reply corrects Chomsky's impression of the aims and uses of such thought experiments and defends his methodology. He agrees with Chomksy that 'belief-desireintention psychological explanation of most human action is unsystematic, highly contextual, and at present more the province of common sense than systematic science,' while nonetheless maintaining 'that some recognizable though vast refinement and elaboration of the belief-desire-intention model will find a place in systematic psychology.' Burge's reply to Chomsky is a careful reflection not only on the notions of meaning and content, but also on philosophical methodology by one of the most original, skilful, and subtle employers of that philosophical tool, the thought experiment.
Other More than fifty years have passed since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter 'UDHR') in 1948. Philosophical Theory and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights poses questions about the impact and legacy of the UDHR: 'What do we make of "human rights" more than half a century after the Universal Declaration a declaration for which many, like [Jacques] Maritain, had so much hope? 'How does the contemporary practice of rights fit with traditional theories of rights? What has been the effect of political and legal instruments such as the UHDR? What have events of the recent past shown us about these theories and declarations?'
The UDHR, the first document to enumerate a set of globally recognized rights, marked a watershed in the internationalization of human rights, which were previously protected under national law. The essays extend beyond the scope of philosophical theory and the foundations of human rights, as the title would suggest, to questions of implementation and protection of these rights, a challenge that remains more than fifty years after the creation of the UDHR. The contributions to this volume are divided into three sections that address concepts of human rights, the UDHR's role in articulating and protecting human rights, and the challenges to the theory and application of human rights that have emerged since the UDHR.
There is significant overlap among these three sections, and the questions of justification for human rights, or at least for particular conceptions of rights, never lie far beneath the surface. Additionally, three major themes cut across these three sections. One is on the question of the adequacy of consensus as a foundation for human rights. While consensus may treat certain practices as legitimate such as slavery and colonialism that later become discredited, we may also want to protect other rights such as gender equality that do not enjoy universal consensus. Howard P. Kainz's chapter rejects this consensus approach and grounds human rights in a more universalist foundation, a Thomistic conception of human nature. On the other hand, those more sympathetic to dialogic or discourse ethics see consensus itself as the basis for ethical norms. In his chapter, Bradley R. Munro describes the process of reaching consensus on the UDHR from within divergent ethical traditions. A second theme that cuts across many of the essays in this volume is the contribution of French philosopher Jacques Maritain, one of the principal architects of the UDHR, to the theory of human rights. A third focus of this volume is the impact of the UDHR on Canada's legal system. Jack Iwanicki examines the use of the UDHR and other international human rights treaties in decisions issued by the Canadian Supreme Court, while Paul Groarke and J.L.A. West address the liberal-communitarian debate in the context of the Canadian constitutional regime, arguing that a Thomistic model of the common good can provide a resolution to this divide by incorporating elements of the individual good.
These common threads running through the book should not obscure the topical and philosophical diversity of the essays in this volume. Aside from the major themes mentioned above, other essays cover such topics as indigenous claims to land ownership, genocide in Rwanda, and women's rights. The approaches that the authors apply and evaluate include feminist theory, liberal models of rights, and virtue theory. The wide-ranging discussion of the UDHR, and theories of rights more broadly, make Philosophical Theory and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights an excellent sampling of human rights scholarship. In addition, the book provides a clear picture of remaining philosophical and practical challenges more than fifty years after United Nations General Assembly's adoption of the Universal Declaration. ( Valverde's particular interest is in what is generally called vice regulation; she examines how governments exercise their police powers to maintain cleanliness and social order and prevent and deter uncleanliness and disorder in the general population. She discovers that there is no single form of knowledge employed in these cases. Instead, there is a wide range of different techniques that legal officials employ to know whether social order has been disrupted. Much of their knowledge lies somewhere between quotidian observation and expert opinion, or mixes the two together in unexpected ways. There has been much recent focus on how scientific and expert knowledges have invaded and transformed the practice of law. Valverde takes a contrarian position, arguing that a large part of legal regulation still eschews scientific expertise in favour of a melange of so-called 'common sense,' social stereotype, and what she calls the 'forensic gaze' searching for clues or signifiers of social disorder in the style of Sherlock Holmes.
Valverde is fascinated with how states use their police powers to shape and control populations, and how they do so through forms of knowledge. She points out that legal officials often regulate populations through the legal fiction of 'common knowledge.' Common knowledge is what all citizens are expected to know about the world for example, whether a particular customer is drunk and fail to know at their peril. This version
